much influenced by the old traditional ways of thinking and speaking, especially by the doctrine of animal spirits. In general this doctrine, which took many forms, represented an attempt to bridge the gulf between mind and matter, a gulf which, as the conceptions of both mind and matter grew more definite, seemed to yawn more widely. Almost all men who have pondered the problem of the relation of mind to matter seem to have felt it very difficult to suppose that two things so utterly unlike one another should be able to influence one another. They have seemed to take for granted as an implicit premise the proposition that only things of like nature can influence one another. This proposition is one of those [c] hunches' which may fairly be accepted as working hypotheses or guides to the search for empirical evidence, but which the metaphysically inclined are apt to set up as *a priori* truths that may serve as premises for the deduction of an account of the nature of things. Its acceptance led to the assumption of animal spirits which, being something less solid than matter and something more material than mind, might serve as an intermediary and thus make easier the belief in reciprocal influence between them.

Animal spirits were generally conceived (like the psyche itself by the early atomists and some of the Fathers) as a very subtile kind of matter, a thin, imperceptible fluid capable of permeating and working within more solid matter. For some physiologists, as for

Descartes, the animal spirits were this and nothing more. But for others they were literally spirits, a multitude of more or less intelligent little beings which worked within the animal body to govern and direct its mechanical processes. For others, again, the doctrine of animal spirits